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CAPITAL STRUCTURE POLICIES IN EUROPE: 
SURVEY EVIDENCE 
  
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper we present the results of an international survey among 313 CFOs 
on capital structure choice. We document several interesting insights on how 
theoretical concepts are being applied by professionals in the U.K., the 
Netherlands, Germany, and France and we directly compare our results with 
previous findings from the U.S. Our results emphasize the presence of pecking-
order behavior. At the same time this behavior is not driven by asymmetric 
information considerations. The static trade-off theory is confirmed by the 
importance of a target debt ratio in general, but also specifically by tax effects 
and bankruptcy costs. Overall, we find remarkably low disparities across 
countries, despite the presence of significant institutional differences. We find 
that private firms differ in many respects from publicly listed firms, e.g. listed 
firms use their stock price for the timing of new issues. Finally, we do not find 
substantial evidence that agency problems are important in capital structure 
choice. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Capital structure policy deals with the financing of firm’s activities, with debt, equity 
and intermediate securities. Since Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) a theoretical 
framework has been developed in which contributions that aim to explain the capital 
structure decisions of financial managers are embedded. Within this theoretical 
framework the static trade-off theories of tax benefits, bankruptcy costs and agency 
problems are well-established. More recently, the pecking-order theory has been added 
as a description of capital structure choice. After Modigliani and Miller concluded 
irrelevance under stringent assumptions, subsequent work has added many potential 
explanations for capital structure policies in firms. 
While the development of theory has evolved rapidly, empirical research lagged 
behind. For example Rajan and Zingales (1995) raise the question: What do we know 
about capital structure? Unfortunately we have to conclude, from this and many other 
empirical papers, that we understand only part of the practice of capital structure choice. 
This study aims to add to the empirical literature by providing survey evidence on 
capital structure choice in firms in four large European economies. For the U.K., the 
Netherlands, France and Germany we describe in great detail the relevance of factors 
driving capital structure choice. 
A recent strand of empirical literature has applied the survey instrument to 
rigorously confront practioners’ views with theory. The most famous study in this field 
is Graham and Harvey (2001). In their study the authors analyze the practice of 
corporate finance within a sample of 392 U.S. CFOs, by focusing on the relevance of 
important theoretical factors in capital structure choice, as well as in cost of capital 
estimations and capital budgeting. In a subsequent study Bancel and Mittoo (2004) 
examine capital structure policies of 87 CFOs from 16 different European countries. 
Due to the limited sample size, these authors do not present country-specific results and 
whereas Graham and Harvey surveyed both publicly listed and private firms, Bancel 
and Mittoo’s sample exclusively consists of public firms. The added value of our survey 
is that we present results for a sample of 313 CFOs from four European countries. We 
have both public and private firms in our sample and we have a sufficient number of 
observations per country, which allows us to describe the determinants of capital 
structure policies in each of the four nations and to investigate the impact of a public 
listing. Our setup is similar to Graham and Harvey’s U.S. approach and thereby we can 
directly test whether their conclusions are also valid outside the U.S. We pay 
particularly attention to differences between CEOs of private firms versus their 
collegues in publicly listed firms. 
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Overall, our results show some intriguing patterns in capital structure choices. 
We document remarkably low disparities between corporate debt policies across 
countries. Respondents in all four national samples report financial flexibility to be the 
key factor when determining their debt structure, a result which corroborates previous 
studies from the U.S. and the 16-country European sample. However, the importance of 
flexibility is not driven by the pecking-order theory. In line with Graham and Harvey 
(2001) we find evidence which moderately supports the static trade-off theory in each 
of the four countries. At the same time we find no convincing evidence in the full 
sample for agency problems, signaling, or a role of capital structure in control contests 
in either country. This is a striking result, because the theoretical and empirical 
literature largely focuses on these issues. The findings are also surprising in comparison 
with earlier results by Bancel and Mittoo (2004), who find signaling and agency 
problems to be important factors in capital structure choice. Finally, we find that the 
influence of a quotation at a stock exchange induces several factors to be only relevant 
for these public firms. Public firms tend to time new issues on the basis of their stock 
price. Also, public firms consider debt relevant to become an unattractive takeover 
target, while these control contests are not relevant in private firms. Finally, in 
comparison with private firms, listed firms are more inclined to signal their prospects to 
financial markets by increased debt levels. 
 The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the survey 
procedures. In section 3 we describe the firm’s sample statistics. Section 4 tests static 
trade-off theories and section 5 focuses on asymmetric information-based theories, such 
as the pecking-order theory. Section 6 investigates the practical relevance of agency 
theory in capital structure and section 7 describes miscellaneous issues. Section 8 
concludes. 
 
2. Data and methodology  
 
Our survey questions exactly match Graham and Harvey’s (2001) inquiries on capital 
structure policy, which facilitates a direct comparison of our results. Bancel and Mittoo 
(2004) also address these questions in their study. In addition, we posed questions about 
cost of capital estimations and capital budgeting; the results for these questions are 
described in Brounen, De Jong and Koedijk (2004). 
From the Amadeus dataset of Bureau Van Dijk we selected all firms with a staff 
of a least 25 employees. We also collected data on sales, industry and public listing. 
Next, we use the Kompass database with names and positions of the high-ranked 
officials and collect the names of the CFO for each firm in the Amadeus data set. First, 
we select all public firms in each country. We complement our sample sets with 
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randomly chosen private firms of which the name of the CFO is disclosed. Our final set 
contains 2000 firms in the U.K., Germany and France, and 500 firms in the Netherlands.  
The text of the survey of Graham and Harvey (2001) has been translated into 
German and French by a certified translation agency and into Dutch by the authors. We 
conducted trial sessions with CFOs in each of the four countries to test whether the 
translations were correct and understandable. We adjusted the wording and added brief 
explanations, based on the CFO’s feedback. In these sessions the average time to fill out 
the questionnaire was around 15 minutes. In the period of November 1 to 8, 2002 the 
questionnaires were sent by mail to the sample firms. The questionnaire was sent out by 
a third party, in order to ensure that the results are handled anonymously, expecting that 
this stimulates respondents to answer frankly. Each firm received a cover letter, the 
four-page questionnaire, a pre-stamped envelope and a response form to request a free 
report of the results. The latter serves as an incentive to fill in the questionnaire. The 
respondents were offered the opportunity to return their questionnaire by mail or by fax. 
Two weeks after the firms had received the questionnaire all non-respondents were 
contacted by phone by native speakers, reminding them to return the questionnaire. 
During the phone conversation, the respondents could go through the questions over the 
phone immediately or receive by email a link to a web page for filling in the 
questionnaire. This telephonic and email effort lasted until January 7, 2003 and we 
received our last response on January 30, 2003.  
In total, we received 313 responses, 68 in the U.K., 52 in the Netherlands, 132 in 
Germany and 61 in France. We received 50.5% of the questionnaires by mail or fax, 
19.2% by telephonic interviews and 30.3% through the web page. We analysed our 
results with regard to potential response biases, which are a common threat to survey 
research.1,2 Overall, we find that our sample is representative of the overall universe of 
firms and we detect only a small variation in answers based on the response technique. 
                                                 
1 We investigate whether the returned questionnaires contain a bias, caused by the type of response 
medium or by the sequence of questions. First, we cluster our results along the way in which the 
responses have been received (mail, fax, telephone or internet) and analyse both the average responses 
and the distributions within each cluster. In total we have 68 items and 4 response clusters. Using a 
standard mean-test for all 6 comparisons between the 4 clusters we find 14 differences significant at the 
10% level. This implies that the results are not biased, because for a random set we expect 41 significant 
differences (10% of 68 times 6). At the 5% level we find 9 differences and expected 20. We found no 
distinct patterns in the differences between clusters. For our second test we sent out two versions, with 
questions 1-4 and 11-14 interchanged. We find at the 10% significance level 2 differences between the 
two sets, while a random set would yield 8 differences (10% of 68). At the 5% level we find 1 difference 
and expected 4. Thus, we detect no significant differences in responses based on the questionnaire 
structure.  
2 We performed an experiment in order to investigate whether our results are affected by non-response 
bias. We follow the example of Moore and Reichert (1983) by comparing characteristics firm size, 
industry, and public status of the responding firms to the non-respondents. We find no statistically 
significant differences between the two groups on a 5% confidence level and therefore we may consider 
our sample to be representing the population.  
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The overall response rate is 5%, which is somewhat lower than studies like Trahan and 
Gitman (1995) and Graham and Harvey (2001), which obtained a 12% and 9% response 
rate respectively. However, given the length and depth of our questionnaire and the vast 
size of our sample we feel confident when analysing our results.  
Our questionnaire includes questions about firm characteristics and about the 
CFOs’ views on factors related to capital structure choice. The general firm 
characteristics are size (sales), industry, publicly listed/private, regulated and dividend 
policy. We also ask for characteristics specifically related to capital structure: the debt 
ratio, presence of a target ratio, and whether the firm considered the issuance of equity, 
convertible debt and foreign debt. The remaining questions measure the CFOs’ views 
on the factors related to capital structure choice on a scale from 0 (not important) to 4 
(very important). In our analysis we also include Bancel and Mittoo’s (2004) results for 
the 87 firms from 16 European countries and Graham and Harvey’s (2001) data for 393 
U.S. firms.3 Our analysis starts with the description of our sample by the firm 
characteristics in Table 1. Tables 2 and 3 contain average scores per country for the 
importance of capital structure factors, for the full sample and for sub-samples based on 
leverage or target ratio. In capital structure, leverage and target ratio are the most 
relevant determinants. Comparisons of sub-samples based on multiple criteria are 
limited, due to the number of observations per sub-sample. Therefore, in Tables 4 and 5 
we describe ordered logit regressions, which simultaneously measure the impact of 
several firm characteristics on capital structure choice. The regression tests require an 
ordered logit regression technique, because of the ordinal 5-point Likert scales we apply 
(see Peterson and Harrell, 1990). In Tables 4 and 5 we select factors from respectively 
Tables 2 and 3 and explain their importance by country dummies and a dummy for 
private firms. Because we are particularly interested in the effect of a public listing, we 
also include interaction terms for leverage, target ratio, size and dividend, with a 
dummy for public firms and a dummy for private firms. In Tables 6, 7 and 8 we 
describe average scores per country, specifically for firms which indicated the 
consideration of foreign debt, equity and convertible debt issues. Finally, Table 9 
investigates the relevance of factors in debt maturity per country and for sub-samples 
based on leverage or target ratio. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Graham and Harvey (2003) provide a description of the data in Graham and Harvey (2001), including a 
reference to the data which is publicly available on a web page. We are grateful to the authors for the 
availability of their data, which allows us to incorporate the U.S. data in our study in addition to our 
sample of European firms.  
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3. Description of the sample 
 
The sample of responding firms is described in Table 1. The first four columns describe 
the firms in the U.K., the Netherlands, Germany and France. In the fifth column we 
include Bancel and Mittoo’s (2004) data set of 87 firms from 16 European countries. 
The sixth column contains the Graham and Harvey (2001) data for 393 U.S. firms. 
 
[Please insert Table 1 here] 
 
The sales data provide an overview of the size distribution in the samples. The sample 
distribution within our four European samples shows a distinct resemblance regarding 
this size proxy, given the large proportion in the groups with sales below €500 million. 
It should be noted that the U.K. and France have relatively more firms in the smallest 
size group. The differences with the Bancel and Mittoo data are striking. More than 
80% of their observations belong to the group with sales over €1 billion. This distinct 
sample difference is a direct result of the underlying sample selection procedures. 
Bancel and Mittoo’s Pan-European sample is comprised of all non-French firms with 
daily trading information in La Tribune, complemented with French firms in the SBF 
120 index. As a result of the procedure and as evidenced by the sales data, the sample 
contains relatively large firms. In comparison with the U.S. data, our samples are 
slightly under-represented in the two largest groups. While 51% of all firms in their 
U.S. sample have sales exceeding €500 million, this number is less than 25% in each of 
our European samples. 
 The distribution across industry types is rather similar in all countries, with most 
firms belonging to manufacturing in each sample. Like Graham and Harvey we 
document that non-manufacturing firms are spread evenly across other industries in our 
European samples. The Bancel and Mittoo data has relatively few firms in the 
manufacturing industry, while the financial section is over-represented. 
 As a result of the sample selection procedure all Bancel and Mittoo’s firms are 
publicly listed. In the U.K. and U.S. more than half of the sample consists of exchange-
listed firms, while in the other countries the fractions are lower. For the fraction of 
regulated utilities we find that in France these firms are more present than in the other 
countries. Dividend-payers are present in all countries’ samples for over 50%. 
Regarding corporate debt policy, we find that about a quarter of the firms in the U.K. 
and France have no long-term debt at all. These firms are financed completely with 
equity and short-term liabilities. The German firms are over-represented in the 10-19% 
interval, while many Dutch firms are in the 20-29% interval. Subsequently, we define 
low-levered firms as firms with leverage below 30%, while highly levered firms have a 
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debt ratio above 30%. The fractions of firms with low and high leverage are hardly 
different between the countries. The only exception is France, which is under-
represented in the highest interval. This international pattern in leverage complies with 
previous studies of Rajan and Zingales (1995) and De Bondt (1998), which document 
similar national differences and explain them by emphasizing institutional differences.  
 
4. Trade-off theory of capital structure choice 
 
The static trade-off theory predicts a trade-off between tax advantages and bankruptcy 
costs of debt. According to this theory, firms balance beneficial tax shields with the 
financial distress costs when determining the appropriate amount of corporate debt. 
Firms that act along the lines of the static trade-off paradigm are expected to have a 
target debt ratio. 
 
[Please insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Figure 1 shows that in the U.K., the Netherlands and Germany over two-thirds of firms 
aim for some target debt ratio. Of the French firms in our sample less than a third has a 
target ratio. A second striking result is that in each of the countries merely 10% of all 
firms maintain a strict target. Although the target ratio is evidence in favor of the static 
trade-off theory, the theory also prescribes specific determinants of this target debt 
ratio. We further test the trade-off theory by inquiring about the importance of several 
determinants. In Tables 2 and 3 we describe the responses. 
 
[Please insert Tables 2 and 3 here] 
 
The two prevailing determinants of leverage in the static theory are tax benefits and 
bankruptcy costs. We find that tax advantages of interest expenses are considered to be 
the fourth most important factor when considering the proper amount of debt (see row 
(a)), after financial flexibility, credit ratings and earnings volatility. The cross-national 
variation in this result is modest and indicates that tax advantages are considered to be 
of equal importance to European and U.S. firms, which the only exception that German 
CFOs attach lower importance to tax influences. An interesting discovery in Table 2 is 
that firms with higher leverage and a target debt ratio are more likely to consider tax 
advantages of debt an important factor. In Table 4 we further investigate the relevance 
of tax effects.  
 
[Please insert Tables 4 and 5 here] 
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The ordered logit regression in row (a) of Table 4 confirms that German firms consider 
tax effects significantly less important. This is a striking result, because La Porta et al. 
(2000) describe corporate tax rates in our countries and the German rate is highest 
(54%), in comparison with the other countries (between 33% and 42%). The 
insignificant coefficient for private firms (Private) indicates that the listed firms do not 
consider taxation more or less important. The significantly positive coefficients for the 
interaction term of Public and Size (effect of size in public firms) and the interaction 
term of Private and Size (effect of size in private firms) show that taxation is more 
important for larger firms, irrespective of the public/private status. The private firms 
with a target ratio and public firms that pay dividends consider taxes to be relatively 
important.  
Desai (1998) concludes that foreign debt is issued in response to tax advantages 
in the foreign country. A sub-sample of firms has considered issuing debt in foreign 
countries. In Table 6 we report the responses of these firms. We report the average 
national response in row (a) of Table 6, which yields comparable results ranging 
between 1.0 for France and 2.27 for the U.K. All in all, the outcomes indicate that tax 
shield advantages are taken in into account by European firms, and overall the 
importance is comparable those reported previously for U.S. studies. 
 
[Please insert Table 6 here] 
 
The negative effects of debt financing, i.e. bankruptcy costs, appear to be considered 
less important judging by the results in Table 2, row (b). On a scale of 0 to 4, costs of 
bankruptcy scores range only between 0.65 for France and 1.42 for the Netherlands. 
Bankruptcy costs are most relevant in firms with volatile earnings and cash flows 
(Table 2, row (h)). We find that volatility is an important determinant in all countries, 
emphasizing the importance of bankruptcy effects. Again, we find no compelling 
variation across countries or continents for the two questions discussed above. This is 
surprising, because bankruptcy costs depend of a country’s bankruptcy system. Pochet 
(2002) describes the insolvency codes in five countries and considers the German, 
French and U.S. systems debtor-oriented, because debtors are temporarily protected to 
aim to maintain the business as a going concern. In the U.K. (Pochet, 2002) and the 
Netherlands (Couwenberg, 2001) creditor-oriented systems prevail, which are harsh on 
defaulting firms. Based on these institutional differences we would expect bankruptcy 
effects to be more pronounced in the U.K. and the Netherlands. Instead, we find strong 
similarities across countries, with one exception. In line with the debtor-orientation in 
the German system, this country scores relatively low in rows (b) and (h). We do find 
that firms with high leverage seem more concerned about these costs, which is an 
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obvious result because their expected bankruptcy costs are larger. From Table 4, row 
(h), we conclude that the public status of a firm does not influence the importance of 
volatility. As expected, since bankruptcy costs are part of the static trade-off theory, we 
find that both public and private firms with a target ratio consider volatility more 
important. In all countries we find that firms consider bankruptcy costs to be of lesser 
importance than tax advantages. 
Finally, personal tax effects may offset or increase the tax advantage of debt and 
thereby impact the optimal balance between corporate tax effects and bankruptcy costs. 
The low scores in row (f) of Table 2 clearly show that, similar to the U.S., our European 
firms do not put much weight on the personal tax considerations of their investors. 
Apparently, firms do not try to attract specific investor clienteles through their capital 
structure choice.4 However, Table 4 indicates that public firms consider personal taxes 
significantly more important than private firms. 
Welch (2004) argues that stock returns affect market value debt ratios, because 
the value of equity changes. Thus, in case firms express their target debt ratios in 
market values, they will have to rebalance after changes in equity value. We test this 
hypothesis and the results in row (g) of Table 3 indicate that the scores are indeed much 
higher in market-oriented countries. The U.S. and U.K. scores of 1.08 and 0.82, 
respectively, well exceed the other countries. A plausible explanation for this 
international variation is that the firms in the latter countries are less likely to be 
exchange-listed. The European sample of Bancel and Mittoo has the highest score, 
which is driven by the fact that all respondent’s firms are exchange-listed and thus have 
market values readily available. This conclusion can also be drawn from Table 5, where 
the response to question (g) is significantly lower for private firms at the 1% 
significance level. Interestingly, in the sub-sample of public firms we find a positive 
effect for firms with a target and a negative effect for dividend-payers. 
Fisher, Heinkel and Zechner (1989) argue that transaction costs prevent firms 
from frequently rebalancing their capital structure. Whether transactions costs and fees 
are important in capital structure choice is shown in Table 2, row (e). This transaction 
costs hypothesis receives moderate support, with scores ranging between 1.26 for the 
Netherlands and 1.75 for the U.K. The U.S. and the Bancel and Mittoo samples score 
higher, respectively 1.95 and 1.94. In row (e) of Table 4, it is shown that this factor is 
less important in private firms, but the coefficient is not significant at the 10% level. We 
also ask firms whether they delay the issuance of debt because of transactions costs and 
fees, but the low values, which are stated in row (e) of Table 3, yield little support for 
                                                 
4 Based on Miller (1977), Rajan and Zingales (1995, p.1441) tabulate tax effects for several types of 
investors, for G-7 countries. The tax structures differ across countries, which is not reflected in country 
differences in our results.  
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this notion. Apparently transaction costs do not serve as a key driver of corporate debt 
policy. The subset of firms with a target debt ratios scores significantly higher in several 
countries in these two questions. The results in Table 5 show that this factor is 
significantly more important in public firms. 
 
5. Asymmetric information explanations of capital structure 
 
In the theoretical corporate finance literature asymmetric information problems have 
received wide-spread attention. These theories start from the premise that inside 
managers are better informed than outside investors. As a result, financing decisions 
inform outsiders about the information insiders have. Based solely on public 
information, these theories are difficult to test.    
 
Pecking-order model of financing hierarchy 
The pecking-order model of Myers and Majluf (1984) hypothesizes a hierarchy in 
financing means. First, firms prefer internal financing. Then, external financing is 
preferred, where debt is preferred over equity. The degree of asymmetric information 
determines the relative costs of each financing source. Firms that follow this pecking 
order do not have a target debt ratio, because the ordering determines their preference 
regarding the issuance of new capital. 
Row (g) of Table 2 demonstrates that financial flexibility is the most important 
factor that influences the amount of debt in each of the five countries, with scores 
between 2.59 in the U.S. and 1.84 in France. In the Pan-European sample of Bancel and 
Mittoo the score is even 3.39. On the one hand, this seems to be evidence in favor of the 
pecking-order model, since flexibility increases the possibility to choose between 
different financing alternatives. On the other hand, Opler et al. (1999) show that 
flexibility may be important for other reasons than the pecking order. Interesting is that 
in France and the U.K. flexibility is significantly more important in firms with a target 
debt ratio. This finding contradicts the pecking-order interpretation of this question. A 
more detailed test of the pecking-order theory is to investigate the relationship between 
asymmetric information and the desire for flexibility. Graham and Harvey use size and 
dividends as proxies for information problems, i.e. larger and dividend-paying firms 
have less asymmetry. Therefore, larger firms and dividend-payers are expected to score 
lower on flexibility. For the U.S. the inverse is found. Larger firms score 
(insignificantly) higher and also dividend-payers score higher (significant at the 1% 
level). In an untabulated analysis we find the same results in each of the four European 
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countries.5 The difference between large and small firms is significant (at 10% level) for 
the U.K. and – except for Germany – larger than the difference in the U.S. For 
dividends, again the difference in the U.K. is significantly (1% level) different from 
zero and always larger than in the U.S. Our multivariate analysis in Table 4 highlights 
that financial flexibility is more important in dividend-paying firms. These results 
corroborate Graham and Harvey’s conclusion that financial flexibility is not driven by 
the pecking-order theory.  
Our survey includes several questions related to pecking-order behavior. In row 
(a) of Table 3 we inquire whether a debt issue is triggered by insufficient recent profits. 
The results are weak and scattered, ranging between 1.24 for France and 2.30 for 
Germany. Another test of the pecking order is whether equity issues are influenced by 
the availability internal funds. We describe the considerations of firm that considered an 
equity issue in Table 7. 
 
[Please insert Table 7 here] 
 
The result in Table 7, row (g), which link recent profits to the considering of the 
issuance of new equity, provide very weak confirmation of a pecking order. Row (l) of 
this Table 7 shows that the inability of obtaining debt financing is even less important 
when considering a new equity issue. The amount by which a firm’s stock is being 
undervalued or overvalued appears to be more important when considering an equity 
offer. Firms that seriously consider issuing common stock rates the importance of the 
current stock valuation between 1.69 in the Netherlands and 2.69 in the U.S., making it 
the second most important consideration.  
In Table 3, row (d) reports what the score is on debt issues when equity is 
undervalued. This behavior would be consistent with pecking-order theory. Compared 
to the 1.56 score in the U.S. our European firms score relatively low. This result nicely 
illustrates the role of security pricing in public markets, which is much lower in 
continental Europe. As expected, the tests in Table 5 result in a significantly negative 
coefficient for private firms. Similarly, Bancel and Mittoo’s results show a much higher 
score, because their sample is entirely composed of large exchange-listed firms. 
                                                 
5 The sub-sample results for Table 2, row (g) are as follows. When comparing the small size firms to the 
large firms we find the following average responses, respectively 2.54 versus 2.65 (U.S.), 2.02 versus 
2.88 (U.K., this difference is significant at a 10% level), 2.22 versus 2.70 (Netherlands), 2.16 versus 2.23 
(Germany) and 1.72/2.50 (France). Regarding the split ups based on dividend policy we report the 
following average responses for dividend payers and non-dividend payers: 2.73 versus 2.40 (U.S., this 
difference is significant at a 1% level), 2.74 versus 1.33 (U.K., this difference is significant at a 1% 
level), 2.43 versus 2.00 (Netherlands), 2.36 versus 1.98 (Germany) and 2.03 versus 1.40 (France). 
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Overall, our results for the pecking-order model confirm Graham and Harvey’s 
conclusions: results are in line with the predictions of the pecking-order theory. 
However, given the results on information differences, asymmetries do not drive the 
pecking order.  
 
Recent increases in price of common stock 
In the previous analysis we found that European firms reported equity prices to be 
rather unimportant when considering debt issues and relatively important when 
planning an issue of new equity. Besides this relative value of stocks we are also 
interested in whether the absolute variation in stock prices is influencing the issuance of 
common stock. The results in row (a) of Table 7 show that recent rises in stock prices 
favor the issuance of new stock in the U.S. and U.K., while our continental European 
samples pay less attention to stock prices when considering stock issues. This finding 
emphasizes the relative importance of public capital markets in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries. 
 
Signaling private information with debt and equity 
According to signaling models, firms can signal quality to investors using their capital 
structure decisions (Ross, 1977 and Leland and Pyle, 1977). We expect that higher 
accounting standards reduce private information and thus the information-value of 
signalling. La Porta et al. (1998) describe a rating for accounting standards, which 
ranges from 62 (Germany) and 64 (Netherlands) to 69 for France and 71 for the U.S. 
The highest score is for the U.K., 78. Contrary to our expectations, Table 3, row (b) 
illustrates that this motivation scores low in all countries, between 0.65 in the 
Netherlands and 1.06 in France, in all samples when relating it to debt policy. 
Obviously, we expect this factor to be most relevant among listed firms. Indeed, Table 5 
yields a significantly negative coefficient for private firms. Moreover, the Bancel and 
Mittoo sample yield a high score of 1.55, which can be attributed to the public status of 
the firms in their sample. Focusing on equity issues, row (h) of Table 7 yields 
comparable results, indicating that the firms in our sample do not actively signal 
information on their corporate prospects and value through their capital structure policy.  
 
Private information and convertible stock issuance 
In Table 8 we report the factors of importance in convertible debt issues, for the sub-
sample of firms that consider a convertible debt issue. 
 
[Please insert Table 8 here] 
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Following Brennan and Kraus (1987) we investigate whether convertible debt can be 
used to attract investors who are uncertain about the firm’s risks. Table 8, row (h) 
reveals that this is relevant in the U.S. (2.07), Netherlands (2.33) and Germany (2.40), 
while U.K. firms (1.00) and French firms (0.67) consider this motive not to be relevant. 
Stein (1992) derives a model in which convertibles are “back-door” equity, because 
they avoid the issuance of undervalued equity. According to our results in row (a) of 
Table 8 this is indeed important when considering convertible debt. In all samples 
scores are high and range between 2.83 in the Netherlands and 1.50 in France. 
 
Timing interest rates and credit rating 
In the previous section we inquired about timing on the basis of private information 
within a firm. Managers may also try to time their issues because they expect that 
economy-wide interest rates may change. Row (c) of Table 3 yields the surprising result 
that this is the most important factor in U.S. firms, with a score of 2.22. The scores for 
the European countries tend to be considerably lower with Germany on the high end 
1.87, while Dutch firms report only 1.19 on average. In Table 9 we ask firms about 
factors, which affect their choice between short-term and long-term debt.   
 
[Please insert Table 9 here] 
 
Rows (a) and (c) of Table 9 report the influence of expected long and short interest rates 
in this context and again we find slightly lower values for our European firms compared 
to the U.S. results of Graham and Harvey. Flannery (1986) argues that managers who 
expect a higher credit rating than their current rating – because they have superior 
information – will choose short debt, as their rates for long debt will improve. Table 9, 
row (e) shows that this argument receives only weak support, only a small minority of 
firms in each sample consider this argument to be relevant. The respondents most likely 
interpreted credit ratings in a broad way, because in continental Europe rating agencies 
are less active, in comparison with Anglo-Saxon countries. However, the results for this 
question are similar. 
Finally, we describe whether firms issue foreign debt because foreign rates are 
more favorable in Table 6, row (e). The scores are much higher in the U.S. (2.19), the 
Netherlands (2.42) and Germany (2.64), in comparison with the U.K. (1.36) and France 
(1.38).  
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6.  Agency costs 
 
Since the contribution of Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency problems are at the heart 
of the capital structure literature. Agency costs are normally considered as part of the 
static trade-off, based on asymmetric information and disaligned interest problems. In 
this section we will discuss several specific agency problems. La Porta et al. (1998) 
describe institutional details for many countries throughout the world concerning the 
protection of shareholders and creditors. Because these institutions diverge across 
countries, the potential for agency problems also differs across countries. Therefore, it 
is interesting to investigate cross-country differences in the importance of agency 
problems. 
The underinvestment problem, as introduced by Myers (1977), is an agency 
problem between bondholders and shareholders that arises in situations of debt 
overhang. In firms with good growth opportunities, new projects will not be started if 
leverage is high. The motivation is that in these situations bondholder will benefit more 
than shareholders. In Table 2, row (n) we ask our respondents whether they restrict their 
borrowing such that profits from new projects can be captured fully by shareholders 
instead of being paid out as interest to bondholders. The low scores in the range of 0.73 
for the Netherlands and 1.30 for the U.K. offer little support for this notion. Because the 
problem is induced by high leverage we expect that the underinvestment problem is 
more relevant in the high leverage samples. In France we indeed find significantly 
different scores of 2.17 and 1.13, indicating that underinvestment matters more in 
highly levered firms. However, for Germany we find the inverse difference, which is 
also significant at the 10% level. Myers’ (1977) model also implies that this 
underinvestment problem can be mitigated by short term financing. In row (d) of Table 
9 we test this hypothesis and the results are in line with our earlier findings, again 
scores are consistently below 1.00.  
 Asset substitution is another agency problem between shareholders and 
bondholders, in which shareholders prefer high-risk projects, because they can fully 
benefit from the upside potential. On the other hand, bondholders have a fixed claim 
and prefer projects with lower risk. Leland and Toft (1996) model this problem and find 
short term debt as a solution. Table 9, row (f) reports low scores, well below 1.00, in 
each of the five countries. Green (1984) has developed a prominent model in which 
asset substitution is mitigated by convertible debt issues. We report in row (b) of Table 
8 that protecting bondholders against unfavorable actions of shareholders and managers 
is not an important factor in the convertible debt choice, again the results are consistent 
and are equal or less than 1.00. 
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Overall, we conclude that the results for the five countries are remarkably 
similar. By constructing an anti-director index La Porta et al. (1998) show that 
shareholders have a much larger influence in U.S. and U.K. firms. Thus, one would 
expect shareholder-bondholder problems in countries with high shareholder influence 
and low creditor rights, i.e. the U.S. In Germany, one would expect the problems to be 
less relevant. Given these strong institutional differences, it is striking that the theories 
are not found to be relevant in either of the countries. 
Conflicts between managers and equityholders may also influence capital 
structure choice. Jensen (1986) notices that managers may have incentives to strive for 
firm growth by adopting negative NPV projects. Moreover, Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) argue that managers may work less efficiently, because they are merely partial or 
no owners of the firm. Through its fixed obligations debt is considered to be a 
disciplining device, which might mitigate these principle-agent problems. However, our 
results in row (m) of Table 2 imply that the disciplining role of debt is equally 
unimportant in each of the five countries, where scores never exceed 0.70. In this 
question a striking result in the Pan-European Bancel and Mittoo sample arises as 50% 
(almost) always considers this factor and the score is 2.33. Partially, this result can be 
attributed to the sample selection, i.e. in the listed firms manager-shareholder problems 
are more prevalent. Graham and Harvey attribute the low scores in the U.S. result to 
two reasons: (1) respondents’ bias because managers do not want to admit this 
behavior; and (2) unwillingness of managers to discipline themselves through debt. It is 
noteworthy that the above-mentioned anti-director index of La Porta et al. (1998) again 
does not induce cross-country differences.  
 
7. Other factors in capital structure choice 
 
Product market and industry factors 
According to Titman (1984), firms limit their amounts of debt, because stakeholders 
may fear that the firm goes bankrupt. For customers, this causes problems in case of 
spare parts and warranties, while for suppliers similar problems arise. We find little 
confirmation in row (i) of Table 2, where scores are low and scattered between 0.96 in 
the Netherlands and 1.62 in the U.K. In U.K. firms we even find a significant difference 
between firms with high and low leverage in line with the expectation that this problem 
is more relevant in case leverage is higher.  
The product market competition model of Brander and Lewis (1986) 
hypothesizes that substantial amounts of debt are a credible threat to rival firms, in that 
the firm will not reduce production. In each of the five countries, this theory is hardly a 
relevant factor. The scores in row (k) of Table 2 are clustered well below 0.75, and the 
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percentage of firms that (almost) always consider this factor varies between 0% and 
3.33%. 
While the previous results indicate that product market and competitive effects 
are of minor importance, industries may play an important role. A firm’s industry may 
simply serve as a reference point and firms may base their capital structure choices on 
the choices of other firms in the industry. We investigate this behavior in general in row 
(c) of Table 2, and find scores ranging closely between 1.49 for the U.S. and 1.11 for 
the U.K. We also analyze this industry factor when inquiring about the planning of 
equity and convertible debt issuances. Row (f) of Table 7 summarizes the equity results 
which vary between 0.92 for Germany and 1.80 for France. This range is somewhat 
wider for the convertible results in row (d) of Table 8, where the minimum is 0.60 for 
Germany and the maximum is 1.67 in the Netherlands. The evidence is consistent over 
the three questions and over the five countries, as other firms in the industry are 
moderately important. 
 
Control contests 
Harris and Raviv (1988) argue that firms may try to have enough debt in order to be an 
unattractive takeover target. Table 2, row (j) reports that this consideration is relatively 
unimportant, since for all national samples the average scores are below 0.75. Of 
course, because private firms cannot be taken over by a hostile bidder, we expect this 
argument to be less relevant among unlisted firms. Table 4 confirms this conjecture, 
because we find that private firms attach significantly less value to this factor. 
Stulz (1988) claims that managers may object against an issue of common stock, 
because this dilutes their private stakes in the company. Row (j) of Table 7 reports that 
this consideration is most important in the U.S., where the score equals 2.14. In our 
European sample we also find some mild support for this dilution argument, except for 
Germany where the score is only 0.83. We would expect that the Bancel and Mittoo 
sample scores high on this question because the listed firms can be taken over in a 
control contest. On the contrary, the score is as low as in the other samples. As we noted 
in the discussion on agency problems, the similarities in the results are remarkably 
large, given the pronounced institutional differences between the countries.  
 
Risk management 
Many firms receive part of their revenues in foreign currencies. According to Géczy, 
Minton, and Schrand (1997) the issuance of debt, denominated in a foreign currency, 
may provide an efficient hedge against the currency risks created by these foreign 
revenues. In Table 6, we ask respondents whether they use foreign debt issuances as a 
natural hedge and whether they strive to match foreign cash inflows and outflows. The 
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results to these questions are gathered in rows (c) and (d), respectively. The scores on 
foreign debt as a natural hedge are rather high, ranging between 3.15 for the U.S. and 
1.54 for the Netherlands. A similar question is whether foreign debt is issued to match 
cash in flows and out flows (row (b)). Again the average response was high equalling 
1.88 for our German sample up to 2.67 in the U.S. Only in the Netherlands and 
Germany interest rates are more important determinants of foreign debt choice. 
 Another risk management perspective is the matching of debt and asset maturity. 
In each of the five countries, this turns out to be the most important factor in the debt 
maturity decision. The scores in row (b) of Table 9 range between 2.60 for the U.S. and 
1.68 for France. Apparently, firms match the duration of assets and liabilities such that 
changes in the interest rates have the lowest impact on a firm’s operations. 
 
Practical, cash management considerations 
Row (g) of Table 9 shows that the second most important factor in debt maturity choice 
is the preference for long term debt in order to reduce refinancing risk. In accordance 
with Graham and Harvey we find that this factor matters most in highly levered firms, 
indicating that these worry about having to refinance their debt capital in “bad time” 
and therefore prefer long term financing.    
A practical motivation for issuing stock is that the firms have to provide shares 
for bonus or stock option plans. We also detect this relevant importance in row (c) of 
Table 7 where our results cluster around 2.00, except for France where we document 
only 1.40.  
 
Other 
Hanka (1998) argues that a high debt ratio may help firms in bargaining with employees 
for concessions. As row (l) of Table 2 reports, this is the most unimportant factor, as in 
the five countries; only one German firm almost always considers this aspect. 
Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001) find that U.S. firms with high returns on assets 
are more likely to issue debt. They reason that more profitable firms become under-
levered, relative to their targets, and their financing choices serve to off-set earnings-
driven changes. Our findings in row (h) of Table 3 show that this empirical evidence 
does not return in the managers’ opinions, as scores remain well below 0.75 in all 
samples. Also no difference between firms with and without a target debt ratio arises. 
The issuance of common stock influences the earnings per share (EPS), which is 
an often-reported statistic in newspapers and analyst reports. Economically, the value 
should be unaffected by changes in this number simply because the denominator 
changes. However, as row (m) of Table 7 proves, EPS dilution is considered to be very 
important in the U.S., U.K., and in the Netherlands (with scores equalling 2.84, 2.04, 
 18
and 2.23, respectively). Contrasting to Germany and France, where not a single firm 
considers this EPS effect. The marked differences between the more stock market 
oriented countries versus Germany and France emphasize our earlier conclusion about 
the importance of the stock market orientation.  
In row (b) of Table 7 we present the scores on whether firms perceive equity as 
the least risky source of funds. Our results, which range between 1.42 for Germany and 
2.00 for France, give a moderate support for Williamson’s (1988) arguments that equity 
is a cheap form of financing in case low asset-specificity. Row (d) states that only a 
minority of firms considers stock as the cheapest source of funds. 
 Convertible debt issues normally include a call or forced-conversion feature, 
which serves as an option, which can be exercised when valuable. Our results in row (g) 
of Table 8, reports that managers of U.S. and U.K. firms like this feature, given their 
average score 2.29 and 3.00. CFOs of Continental European firms express lower 
appreciation for this call feature.  
 
8. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we examine the practice of capital structure in four European countries: the 
U.K., the Netherlands, Germany and France and compare it to previous results by 
Graham and Harvey for U.S. firms and Bancel and Mittoo for large European publicly 
listed firms. The static trade-off theory predicts that firms have a target debt ratio, based 
on tax and bankruptcy considerations. This theory is moderately supported in each of 
the four European countries. In the U.S. the stronger evidence is found, both for the 
existence of targets and for the role of corporate taxes. In the Pan-European sample of 
Bancel and Mitoo scores on the importance of taxation are higher. Financial flexibility 
is reported to be the most important factor, when determining the proper amount of 
corporate debt. At the same time we find that this urge for flexibility is not driven by the 
pecking-order theory.  
Rajan and Zingales (2003) suggest strong differences in the financial markets 
among the European countries, and also in comparison with the U.S. Because financial 
markets play an important role in theory, we would expect to find that these differences 
are reflected in capital structure decisions of individual firms. Our practical findings 
reflect these institutional differences. For example, in the static trade-off, U.S. and U.K. 
firms tend rebalance after market value changes. In Bancel and Mittoo’s sample 
rebalancing is important, which is in line with the public status of the firms in their 
sample. Mispricing of equity is more important in the U.S. and U.K. in debt and equity 
issues. Because the financial markets consider the EPS measure a relevant yardstick for 
performance, diluting EPS is an important issue in equity issues in the more capital 
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market oriented countries, i.e. the U.S., U.K. and the Netherlands. Our results also show 
that the German and French firms in our sample are less concerned about pricing in 
financial markets in the capital structure choices. In a regression analysis we find that 
publicly listed firms attach more value to the timing new issues. The public firms also 
consider debt important to become unattractive as a takeover target. These control 
contests are not relevant in private firms’ capital structure choices. Finally, in 
comparison with private firms, listed firms are more inclined to signal their prospects to 
financial markets by increased debt levels. Overall, we can conclude that we find 
evidence that financial markets influence capital structure choice. 
The relevance of agency problems and the benefits of signaling in capital 
structure choice are caused by divergent interests and the ability of shareholders and 
creditors to monitor each other and the management. Recent studies document  
strong differences between countries in corporate governance structures (La Porta et al., 
1998). However, we do not find convincing evidence of agency problems, signaling, or 
a role of capital structure in control contests in either country. This is a striking result, 
because the theoretical and empirical literature largely focuses on these issues. The 
findings are also surprising in comparison with results by Bancel and Mittoo, who find 
signaling and agency problems to be important factors in capital structure choice. 
We conclude that the static trade-off theory faces moderate confirmation. 
Financial flexibility is important, but not driven by the pecking-order theory. Several 
practical considerations are highly relevant. Contrary to the institutional variations we 
document strong resemblances among the four European countries and also with the 
U.S. when comparing capital structure policies.  
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Table 1: Sample statistics 
   U.K.  Netherlands  Germany  France  Europe (BM)  U.S. (GH) 
Sales <€25 million  29.41%  7.84%  8.40%  30.51%  0.00%  7.91% 
 €25-€99 million  35.29%  39.22%  34.35%  32.20%  1.15%  16.84% 
 €100-€499 million  16.18%  25.49%  38.17%  16.95%  9.20%  22.19% 
 €500-€999 million  4.41%  7.84%  6.87%  5.08%  8.05%  8.42% 
 €1000-€4999 million  8.82%  9.80%  9.92%  5.08%  41.38%  22.70% 
 >€4999 million  5.88%  9.80%  2.29%  10.17%  40.23%  18.37% 
Industry Retail and wholesale  19.05%  12.00%  6.45%  24.14%  6.90%  9.95% 
 Mining, construction  4.76%  2.00%  9.68%  18.97%  16.09%  3.57% 
 Manufacturing  41.27%  38.00%  50.00%  31.01%  13.79%  37.50% 
 Transportation, energy  6.35%  16.00%  15.32%  5.17%  8.05%  11.22% 
 Communication, media  4.76%  18.00%  4.84%  5.17%  8.05%  5.10% 
 Bank, finance, insurance  9.52%  10.00%  2.42%  3.45%  18.39%  13.78% 
 Tech (software, biotech, etc.)  14.29%  4.00%  11.29%  12.07%  18.39%  8.42% 
 Other  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  10.34%  n.a. 
Publicly listed firm   53.73%  41.18%  22.73%  11.67%  100.00%  65.56% 
Regulated utility   9.84%  6.52%  16.81%  28.57%  6.90%  16.84% 
Dividend paying   61.19%  74.51%  51.54%  71.19%  96.55%  56.38% 
Considered issuing…. Common stock  41.18%  28.85%  9.09%  8.20%  77.01%  39.29% 
 Convertible debt  11.76%  13.46%  3.79%  14.75%  50.57%  24.49% 
 Foreign debt  17.65%  28.85%  28.03%  13.11%  57.47%  36.22% 
Longterm debt ratio 0%  25.00%  6.52%  12.73%  28.57%  1.15%  9.06% 
 1-9%  10.71%  2.17%  8.18%  8.57%  17.24%  10.27% 
 10-19%  12.50%  13.04%  20.00%  14.29%  22.99%  12.99% 
 20-29%  7.14%  23.91%  12.73%  8.57%  14.94%  16.62% 
 30-39%  14.29%  19.57%  15.45%  14.29%  6.90%  16.92% 
 40-49%  8.93%  10.87%  9.09%  11.43%  8.05%  12.39% 
 >49%  21.43%  23.91%  21.82%  14.29%  28.74%  21.75% 
Number of firms   68  52  132  61  87  392 
“n.a.” is not available. 
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Figure 1: Target debt ratio 
US UK France
Netherlands Germany
  No target debt ratio
  Flexible target debt ratio
  Somewhat tight target debt ratio
  Strict target debt ratio
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Table 2: Survey responses to the question "What factors affect how you choose the appropriate amount of debt for your firm?" 
Panel A  U.K.  Netherlands  Germany  France  Europe (BM)  U.S. (GH) 
Summary statistics  % always  % always  % always  % always   % always  % always  
   or almost  or almost  or almost  or almost   or almost  or almost  
   always mean always mean always mean always mean  always mean always mean
                    
(g) Financial flexibility (we restrict debt so we have enough 
internal funds available to pursue new projects when they 
come along) 
 50.00 2.13 
 
51.06 2.32 
 
47.83 2.17 
 
37.25 1.84 
 
90.80 3.39 
 
59.38 2.59 
(d) Our credit rating (as assigned by rating agencies)  27.42 1.48  34.04 1.53  38.60 1.85  30.19 1.58  73.17 2.78  57.10 2.46 
(h) The volatility of our earnings and cash flows  35.48 1.73  42.55 2.06  30.97 1.67  34.78 1.54  32.56 1.97  48.08 2.32 
(a) The tax advantage of interest deductibility  30.16 1.68  37.50 1.90  21.05 1.28  29.63 1.57  58.14 2.59  44.85 2.07 
(e) The transactions costs and fees for issuing debt  25.40 1.68  15.22 1.26  26.32 1.50  21.15 1.42  33.33 1.94  33.52 1.95 
(c) The debt levels of other firms in our industry  16.13 1.11  26.53 1.37  14.04 1.14  12.96 1.24  23.26 1.84  23.40 1.49 
(b) The potential costs of bankruptcy, near-bankruptcy, or 
financial distress 
 30.16 1.37 
 
27.08 1.42 
 
7.08 0.65 
 
24.07 1.22 
 
30.95 1.76 
 
21.35 1.24 
(i) We limit debt so our customers/suppliers are not worried 
about our firm going out of business 
 34.43 1.62 
 
8.33 0.96 
 
15.04 1.10 
 
31.91 1.62 
 
4.65 0.85 
 
18.72 1.24 
(n) We restrict our borrowing so that profits from new/future 
projects can be captured fully by shareholders and do not 
have to be paid out as interest to debtholders 
 21.05 1.30 
 
8.89 0.73 
 
19.27 1.06 
 
22.73 1.27 
 
n.a n.a 
 
12.57 1.01 
(j) We try to have enough debt that we are not an attractive 
takeover target 
 0.00 0.58 
 
2.13 0.38 
 
2.68 0.48 
 
6.52 0.61 
 
1.16 0.44 
 
4.75 0.73 
(f) The personal tax cost our investors face when they receive 
interest income 
 3.23 0.65 
 
4.35 0.61 
 
6.31 0.75 
 
10.00 0.84 
 
10.59 0.96 
 
4.79 0.68 
(k) If we issue debt our competitors know that we are very 
unlikely to reduce our output/sales 
 3.33 0.60 
 
0.00 0.24 
 
2.68 0.43 
 
2.22 0.40 
 
0.00 0.27 
 
2.25 0.40 
(m) To ensure that upper management works hard and 
efficiently, we issue sufficient debt to make sure that a large 
portion of our cash flow is committed to interest payments 
 4.84 0.52 
 
2.22 0.27 
 
0.93 0.31 
 
7.32 0.63 
 
50.00 2.33 
 
1.69 0.33 
(l) A high debt ratio helps us bargain for concessions from our 
employees 
 0.00 0.27 
 
0.00 0.24 
 
0.92 0.30 
 
0.00 0.41 
 
6.98 0.73 
 
0.00 0.16 
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Table 2: Survey responses to the question "What factors affect how you choose the appropriate amount of debt for your firm?" 
Panel B  U.K.  Netherlands  Germany  France 
Leverage and target ratio breakdowns  Leverage Target ratio Leverage Target ratio Leverage Target ratio Leverage Target ratio 
   Low High No Yes Low High No Yes Low High No Yes Low High No Yes 
                      
(g) Financial flexibility (we restrict debt so we have enough internal funds 
available to pursue new projects when they come along)  
1.88 2.83** 1.32 2.63***  2.41 2.17 2.29 2.33  2.21 2.09 2.17 2.16  1.81 2.00 1.61 2.40** 
(d) Our credit rating (as assigned by rating agencies)  1.36 1.63 1.00 1.77**  1.14 2.17* 1.29 1.64  1.71 2.07 1.08 2.21***  1.60 1.50 1.37 2.13 
(h) The volatility of our earnings and cash flows  1.29 2.26** 1.12 2.17***  2.14 1.94 1.79 2.18  1.75 1.56 1.36 1.82*  1.50 1.83 1.15 2.54*** 
(a) The tax advantage of interest deductibility  1.41 2.21* 0.76 2.33***  1.93 1.84 1.36 2.12  1.23 1.36 1.00 1.41  1.57 1.60 1.50 1.75 
(e) The transactions costs and fees for issuing debt  1.29 2.11** 1.04 2.06***  1.25 1.28 0.92 1.39  1.39 1.67 1.42 1.54  1.33 1.80 1.19 2.00* 
(c) The debt levels of other firms in our industry  1.12 1.00 0.84 1.34*  0.87 2.16*** 0.60 1.71***  1.07 1.24 0.83 1.28**  1.25 1.20 1.21 1.31 
(b) The potential costs of bankruptcy, near-bankruptcy, or financial distress 
 
0.88 2.16*** 0.80 1.81***  1.38 1.47 1.00 1.59  0.56 0.78 0.58 0.68  1.09 1.89 1.21 1.27 
(i) We limit debt so our customers/suppliers are not worried about our firm 
going out of business  
1.27 2.06** 1.08 2.03***  0.93 1.00 0.80 1.03  1.06 1.16 1.08 1.10  1.53 2.14 1.58 1.71 
(n) We restrict our borrowing so that profits from new/future projects can be 
captured fully by shareholders and do not have to be paid out as interest to 
debtholders  
1.27 1.29 1.08 1.44  0.86 0.50 0.92 0.66  1.24 0.77* 1.24 0.97  1.13 2.17* 1.19 1.50 
(j) We try to have enough debt that we are not an attractive takeover target 
 
0.53 0.71 0.32 0.79**  0.24 0.61 0.21 0.45  0.27 0.80*** 0.26 0.58**  0.53 1.17 0.58 0.69 
(f) The personal tax cost our investors face when they receive interest income 
 
0.50 0.68 0.52 0.69  0.68 0.50 0.29 0.75*  0.75 0.75 0.86 0.69  0.80 1.00 0.69 1.21 
(k) If we issue debt our competitors know that we are very unlikely to reduce 
our output/sales  
0.55 0.74 0.60 0.64  0.21 0.29 0.15 0.27  0.33 0.58 0.42 0.43  0.31 1.00** 0.36 0.50 
(m) To ensure that upper management works hard and efficiently, we issue 
sufficient debt to make sure that a large portion of our cash flow is 
committed to interest payments  
0.47 0.47 0.52 0.49  0.21 0.35 0.00 0.36***  0.28 0.36 0.25 0.35  0.66 0.50 0.60 0.73 
(l) A high debt ratio helps us bargain for concessions from our employees 
 
0.29 0.21 0.32 0.23  0.24 0.24 0.23 0.24  0.28 0.34 0.28 0.32  0.32 1.00 0.47 0.25 
Averages marked with *, **, *** are significantly different at a 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence level from the average is the preceeding column, using a standard differences of means test. The letters in parenthesese in the 
left column refer to the questions in Graham and Harvey (2001). 
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Table 3: Survey responses to the question "What other factors affect your firm’s debt policy?" 
Panel A  U.K.  Netherlands  Germany  France  Europe (BM)  U.S. (GH) 
Summary statistics  % always  % always  % always  % always   % always  % always  
   or almost  or almost  or almost  or almost   or almost  or almost  
   always mean always mean always mean always mean  always mean always mean
(c) We issue debt when interest rates are particularly low  29.31 1.53  14.89 1.19  32.76 1.87  24.49 1.33  44.83 2.10  46.35 2.22 
(a) We issue debt when our recent profits (internal funds) are 
not sufficient to fund our activities 
 25.42 1.44  34.69 1.69  54.31 2.30  23.53 1.24  24.14 1.56  46.78 2.13 
(d) We use debt when our equity is undervalued by the market  16.07 1.02  6.38 0.62  6.31 0.45  8.16 0.80  43.68 2.08  30.79 1.56 
(g) Changes in the price of our common stock  8.93 0.82  4.44 0.60  2.80 0.46  4.65 0.65  15.12 1.34  16.38 1.08 
(e) We delay issuing debt because of transactions costs and 
fees 
 3.64 0.75  2.13 0.40  5.26 0.75  8.33 0.71  5.81 0.92  10.17 1.06 
(f) We delay retiring debt because of recapitalization costs and 
fees 
 0.00 0.53  2.13 0.55  7.02 0.89  4.35 0.59  n.a. n.a.  12.43 1.04 
(b) Using debt gives investors a better impression of our firm’s 
prospects than issuing stock 
 8.77 0.91  2.08 0.65  4.31 0.75  11.76 1.06  20.00 1.55  9.83 0.96 
(h) We issue debt when we have accumulated substantial 
profits 
 3.57 0.55  2.22 0.49  5.45 0.62  4.65 0.58  1.18 0.72  1.14 0.53 
 
 27
Table 3: Survey responses to the question "What other factors affect your firm’s debt policy?" 
Panel B  U.K.  Netherlands  Germany  France 
Leverage and target ratio breakdowns  Leverage Target ratio Leverage Target ratio Leverage Target ratio Leverage Target ratio 
   Low High No Yes Low High No Yes Low High No Yes Low High No Yes 
(c) We issue debt when interest rates are particularly low  1.24 2.17** 0.83 2.00***  1.45 0.78** 1.29 1.15  1.80 1.98 1.68 1.96  1.25 1.67 1.29 1.43 
(a) We issue debt when our recent profits (internal funds) are 
not sufficient to fund our activities  
1.12 1.89* 1.04 1.76**  1.80 1.53 1.40 1.82  2.11 2.60* 1.64 2.60***  1.13 1.64 0.97 1.81** 
(d) We use debt when our equity is undervalued by the market  0.87 1.33 0.36 1.39
***  0.59 0.67 0.50 0.67  0.56 0.28 0.37 0.49  0.73 1.11 0.69 1.07 
(g) Changes in the price of our common stock  0.81 0.83 0.30 1.16***  0.74 0.39 0.31 0.72  0.60 0.24** 0.49 0.44  0.54 1.33* 0.61 0.75 
(e) We delay issuing debt because of transactions costs and 
fees  
0.77 0.78 0.45 0.88*  0.52 0.22 0.07 0.55***  0.75 0.73 0.64 0.79  0.59 1.22 0.76 0.57 
(f) We delay retiring debt because of recapitalization costs and 
fees  
0.50 0.59 0.39 0.58  0.69 0.33 0.21 0.70**  0.90 0.87 1.00 0.83  0.46 1.11* 0.59 0.57 
(b) Using debt gives investors a better impression of our firm’s 
prospects than issuing stock  
0.82 0.94 0.52 1.19**  0.69 0.58 0.57 0.68  0.61 0.98*** 0.68 0.78  0.90 1.78* 0.89 1.47 
(h) We issue debt when we have accumulated substantial 
profits  
0.50 0.72 0.43 0.66  0.53 0.53 0.31 0.56  0.61 0.63 0.53 0.66  0.51 1.00 0.61 0.50 
Averages marked with *, **, *** are significantly different at a 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence level from the average is the preceeding column, using a standard differences of means test. The letters in parenthesese in the 
left column refer to the questions in Graham and Harvey (2001). 
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Table 4: Ordered logit regression analysis on the question "What factors affect how you choose the appropriate amount of debt for your firm?" 
         Interaction: Public and …  Interaction: Private and …    
  GR FR UK US  Private  Lev Tar Size Div  Lev Tar Size Div  N R2 
(a) The tax advantage of interest deductibility 
-0.69** 
(-2.03) 
-0.16 
(-0.39) 
-0.25 
(-0.68) 
-0.01 
(-0.05)  
-0.35 
(-0.91) 
 
0.31 
(1.44) 
0.36 
(1.19) 
0.82*** 
(3.45) 
0.40* 
(1.65)  
0.11 
(0.47) 
0.78*** 
(3.13) 
0.75** 
(2.04) 
0.25 
(1.09)  546 0.05 
(d) Our credit rating (as assigned by rating agencies) 
0.96*** 
(2.71) 
0.84** 
(1.95) 
0.36 
(0.92) 
0.93*** 
(2.86)  
-0.52 
(-1.31) 
 
0.43* 
(1.89) 
0.68* 
(2.22) 
1.67*** 
(6.54) 
0.15 
(0.61)  
0.14 
(0.59) 
1.13*** 
(4.34) 
0.92** 
(2.40) 
0.16 
(0.67)  543 0.10 
(e) The transactions costs and fees for issuing debt 
0.26 
(0.79) 
0.11 
(0.25) 
0.49 
(1.37) 
0.89*** 
(2.94)  
-0.63 
(-1.61) 
 
-0.03 
(-0.12) 
0.68** 
(2.12) 
-0.37 
(-1.58) 
-0.15 
(-0.60)  
0.44* 
(1.91) 
0.42 
(1.63) 
0.65* 
(1.82) 
0.18 
(0.78)  541 0.03 
(f) 
The personal tax cost our 
investors face when they 
receive interest income 
0.27 
(0.72) 
0.46 
(1.00) 
0.25 
(0.63) 
-0.02 
(-0.06)  
-0.96** 
(-2.30) 
 
-0.23 
(-0.92) 
-0.43 
(-1.30) 
0.47* 
(1.73) 
0.05 
(0.19)  
0.18 
(0.71) 
0.64** 
(2.18) 
-0.18 
(-0.45) 
0.04 
(0.17)  533 0.01 
(g) Financial flexibility 0.14 (0.42) 
-0.62 
(-1.53) 
-0.20 
(-0.55) 
0.45 
(1.49)  
-0.62 
(-1.58) 
 
0.09 
(0.41) 
0.13 
(0.40) 
0.13 
(0.54) 
0.48* 
(1.85)  
-0.20 
(-0.91) 
0.47* 
(1.94) 
-0.21 
(-0.59) 
0.85*** 
(3.71)  540 0.04 
(h) The volatility of our earnings and cash flows 
-0.52 
(-1.59) 
-0.23 
(-0.53) 
-0.33 
(-0.90) 
0.18 
(0.59)  
-0.29 
(-0.76) 
 
0.14 
(0.62) 
0.66** 
(2.20) 
-0.13 
(-0.56) 
-0.09 
(-0.35)  
-0.02 
(-0.11) 
0.79*** 
(3.05) 
0.23 
(0.62) 
0.12 
(0.53)  539 0.02 
(j) 
We try to have enough debt 
that we are not an attractive 
takeover target 
0.60 
(1.49) 
1.25** 
(2.49) 
0.78* 
(1.75) 
0.63* 
(1.74)  
-1.16** 
(-2.42) 
 
0.12 
(0.49) 
0.88** 
(2.46) 
0.28 
(1.08) 
-0.03 
(-0.13)  
1.02*** 
(3.57) 
0.64* 
(1.94) 
-0.26 
(-0.54) 
-0.01 
(-0.04)  529 0.06 
In these pooled ordered logit regressions we regress the response on subquestions from Table 2 on country dummies, a dummy for private status (Private) and on a set of interaction terms. Germany is denoted as GR, 
France is FR. The Dutch observations serve as omitted variable. The coefficients under the heading “Interaction: public and…” are the interaction terms of a dummy variable with value of one (and zero otherwise) for 
public firms with four firm characteristics: Div is a dummy with a value equal to one if firms pay out dividend; Tar is a dummy with value equal to one if firms have a target debt ratio; and Lev and Size are dummy 
variables with value of one if firms are in  the cluster of most levered firms and largest firms, respectively. Similarly, the coefficients under the heading “Interaction: private and…” are the interaction terms of a dummy 
variable with value of one for private firms with the four firm characteristics. The z-statistics are in parentheses below each coefficient. Coefficients marked with *, **, *** are statistically significant at a a 10%, 5%, and 
1% confidence level, respectively. “N” is the number of observations and “R2” denotes the pseudo R2. The letters in parenthesese in the left column refer to the questions in Graham and Harvey (2001).
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Table 5: Ordered logit regression analysis on the question "What other factors affect your firm’s debt policy?"  
         Interaction Public with …  Interaction Private with …    
  GR FR UK US  Private  Lev Tar Size Div  Lev Tar Size Div  N R2 
(a) 
We issue debt when our recent 
profits are not sufficient to fund 
our activities 
0.67** 
(2.11) 
-0.65 
(-1.61) 
-0.42 
(-1.19) 
0.39 
(1.35)  
-0.25 
(-0.62) 
 
0.13 
(0.56) 
0.36 
(1.08) 
-0.47* 
(-1.94) 
0.10 
(0.38)  
0.18 
(0.79) 
0.78*** 
(3.19) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.03 
(-0.14)  539 0.03 
(b) 
Using debt gives investors a 
better impression of our firm’s 
prospects 
0.39 
(1.11) 
0.81* 
(1.87) 
0.53 
(1.35) 
0.35 
(1.09)  
-0.72* 
(-1.75) 
 
0.20 
(0.87) 
0.59* 
(1.74) 
0.11 
(0.43) 
-0.18 
(-0.70)  
0.47* 
(1.96) 
0.25 
(0.93) 
-0.54 
(-1.27) 
0.25 
(1.04)  535 0.03 
(c)  We issue debt when interest rates are particularly low 
1.06*** 
(3.27) 
0.37 
(0.87) 
0.47 
(1.29) 
1.30*** 
(4.39)  
-0.23 
(-0.59) 
 
0.02 
(0.08) 
0.76** 
(2.50) 
0.04 
(0.16) 
0.07 
(0.28)  
-0.13 
(-0.57) 
0.34 
(1.34) 
0.52 
(1.39) 
0.38 
(1.62)  533 0.04 
(d) We use debt when our equity is undervalued by the market 
-0.06 
(-0.15) 
1.27*** 
(2.58) 
0.67 
(1.58) 
1.01*** 
(2.87)  
-2.43*** 
(-5.17) 
 
-0.05 
(-0.21) 
0.97*** 
(2.88) 
-0.11 
(-0.45) 
-0.55** 
(-2.14)  
0.25 
(0.80) 
0.27 
(0.78) 
0.32 
(0.69) 
0.07 
(0.23)  526 0.16 
(e) We delay issuing debt because of transactions costs and fees 
0.80** 
(2.15) 
0.87* 
(1.88) 
0.87** 
(2.11) 
1.37*** 
(2.94)  
-0.98** 
(-2.29) 
 
-0.26 
(-1.09) 
0.73** 
(2.10) 
-0.70*** 
(-2.75) 
-0.38 
(-1.45)  
-0.08 
(-0.35) 
0.69*** 
(2.64) 
0.39 
(1.00) 
0.26 
(1.03)  527 0.05 
(g) Changes in the price of our common stock 
0.21 
(0.49) 
0.84 
(1.53) 
0.69 
(1.58) 
0.53 
(1.47)  
-1.94*** 
(-4.15) 
 
0.10 
(0.45) 
0.90*** 
(2.69) 
0.17 
(0.68) 
-0.74*** 
(-2.80)  
0.05 
(0.18) 
0.06 
(0.18) 
-0.35 
(-0.61) 
0.26 
(0.79)  510 0.13 
In these pooled ordered logit regressions we regress the response on subquestions from Table 3 on country dummies, a dummy for private status (Private) and on a set of interaction terms. Germany is denoted as GR, 
France is FR. The Dutch observations serve as omitted variable. The coefficients under the heading “Interaction: public and…” are the interaction terms of a dummy variable with value of one (and zero otherwise) for 
public firms with four firm characteristics: Div is a dummy with a value equal to one if firms pay out dividend; Tar is a dummy with value equal to one if firms have a target debt ratio; and Lev and Size are dummy 
variables with value of one if firms are in  the cluster of most levered firms and largest firms, respectively. Similarly, the coefficients under the heading “Interaction: private and…” are the interaction terms of a dummy 
variable with value of one for private firms with the four firm characteristics. The z-statistics are in parentheses below each coefficient. Coefficients marked with *, **, *** are statistically significant at a a 10%, 5%, and 
1% confidence level, respectively. “N” is the number of observations and “R2” denotes the pseudo R2. The letters in parenthesese in the left column refer to the questions in Graham and Harvey (2001). 
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Table 6: Survey responses to the question "Has your firm seriously considered issuing debt in foreign countries? If “yes”, what factors affect your firm’s decisions about 
issuing foreign debt?" 
   U.K.  Netherlands  Germany  France  Europe (BM)  U.S. (GH) 
Summary statistics  % always  % always  % always  % always   % always  % always  
   or almost  or almost  or almost  or almost   or almost  or almost  
   always mean always mean always mean always mean  always mean always mean
                    
(c) Providing a “natural hedge” (e.g.: if the foreign currency 
devalues, we are not obligated to pay interest in own 
currency) 
90.91 3.09 
 
38.46 1.54 41.18 2.00 37.50 1.75 
 
n.a. n.a. 
 
85.84 3.15 
(b) Keeping the “source of funds” close to the “use of funds” 
 
72.73 2.55 
 
50.00 1.93 45.45 1.88 50.00 2.00 
 
n.a. n.a. 
 
63.39 2.67 
(a) Favorable tax treatment relative to the home country name 
(e.g.: different corporate tax rates) 
36.36 2.27 
 
42.86 2.00 39.39 1.79 25.00 1.00 
 
n.a. n.a. 
 
52.25 2.26 
(e) Foreign interest rates may be lower than domestic interest 
rates  
9.09 1.36 
 
58.33 2.42 60.61 2.64 25.00 1.38 
 
n.a. n.a. 
 
44.25 2.19 
(d) Foreign regulations require us to issue debt abroad  0.00 0.64  23.08 1.00 6.45 0.65 0.00 0.63  n.a. n.a.  5.50 0.63 
“n.a.” is not available. The question in this table is not included in Bancel and Mittoo (2004). The letters in parenthesese in the left column refer to the questions in Graham and Harvey (2001). 
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Table 7: Survey responses to the question "Has your firm seriously considered issuing common stock? If “yes”, what factors affect your firm’s decisions about issuing 
common stock?" 
   U.K.  Netherlands  Germany  France  Europe (BM)  U.S. (GH) 
Summary statistics  % always  % always  % always  % always   % always  % always  
   or almost  or almost  or almost  or almost   or almost  or almost  
   always mean always mean always mean always mean  always mean always mean
                    
(m) Earnings per share dilution  39.13 2.04 53.85 2.23 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.00  66.04 2.72  68.55 2.84 
(k) The amount by which our stock is undervalued or overvalued 
by the market 
52.17 2.17 38.46 1.69 41.67 1.92 33.33 2.00 
 
53.70 2.44 
 
66.94 2.69 
(a) If our stock price has recently risen, the price at which we can 
issue is “high” 
52.00 2.24 46.15 1.77 33.33 1.50 40.00 1.40 
 
59.26 2.61 
 
62.60 2.53 
(c) Providing shares to employee bonus/stock option plans 56.00 2.44 46.15 1.92 41.67 2.17 0.00 1.40  44.44 2.07  53.28 2.34 
(e) Maintaining target debt-to-equity ratio  40.00 1.72 61.54 2.85 8.33 1.08 60.00 2.80  59.26 2.67  51.59 2.26 
(j) Diluting the holdings of certain shareholders  30.43 1.70 38.46 1.85 8.33 0.83 33.33 1.67  29.63 1.67  50.41 2.14 
(b) Stock is our “least risky” source of funds  24.00 1.76 30.77 1.62 25.00 1.42 40.00 2.00  25.93 1.50  30.58 1.76 
(g) Whether our recent profits have been sufficient to fund our 
activities 
43.48 1.91 35.71 1.86 50.00 1.83 40.00 2.00 
 
32.08 1.94 
 
30.40 1.76 
(f) Using a similar amount of equity as is used by other firms in 
our industry 
13.04 1.00 15.38 1.08 8.33 0.92 20.00 1.80 
 
27.78 1.85 
 
22.95 1.45 
(h) Issuing stock gives investors a better impression of our firm’s 
prospects than using debt 
18.18 1.41 15.38 1.31 16.67 1.42 0.00 0.33 
 
9.06 1.15 
 
21.49 1.31 
(l) Inability to obtain funds using debt, convertibles, or other 
sources 
18.18 1.00 46.67 1.67 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 
 
5.56 0.93 
 
15.57 1.15 
(d) Common stock is our cheapest source of funds  12.00 1.28 0.00 0.92 16.67 1.33 50.00 2.00  7.41 0.67  14.05 1.10 
(i) The capital gains tax rates faced by our investors (relative to 
tax rates on dividends) 
4.76 0.71 14.29 1.00 8.33 0.83 33.33 1.33 
 
7.41 0.98 
 
5.00 0.82 
The letters in parenthesese in the left column refer to the questions in Graham and Harvey (2001). 
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Table 8: Survey responses to the question "Has your firm seriously considered issuing convertible debt? If “yes”, what factors affect your firm’s decisions about issuing 
convertible debt?" 
   U.K.  Netherlands  Germany  France  Europe (BM)  U.S. (GH) 
Summary statistics  % always  % always  % always  % always   % always  % always  
   or almost  or almost  or almost  or almost   or almost  or almost  
   always mean always mean always mean always mean  always mean always mean
                    
(a) Convertibles are an inexpensive way to issue “delayed” 
common stock 
50.00 2.50 66.67 2.83 40.00 2.60 25.00 1.50 
 
57.14 2.45 
 
58.11 2.49 
(f) Our stock is currently undervalued  33.33 2.17 33.33 2.17 80.00 3.20 0.00 0.25  51.16 2.40  50.68 2.34 
(g) Ability to “call” or force conversion of convertible debt 
if/when we need to 
80.00 3.00 16.67 1.17 20.00 1.20 12.50 1.63 
 
54.76 2.43 
 
47.95 2.29 
(e) Avoiding short-term equity dilution  33.33 2.17 83.33 3.17 0.00 1.00 37.50 2.13  51.16 2.16  45.83 2.18 
(h) To attract investors unsure about the riskiness of our 
company 
0.00 1.00 50.00 2.33 60.00 2.40 16.67 0.67 
 
26.83 1.68 
 
43.84 2.07 
(c) Convertibles are less expensive than straight debt 50.00 2.33 50.00 1.83 75.00 3.00 12.50 1.38  35.71 1.86  41.67 1.85 
(d) Other firms in our industry successfully use convertibles 0.00 0.80 16.67 1.67 0.00 0.60 12.50 0.75  18.60 1.09  12.50 1.10 
(b) Protecting bondholders against unfavorable actions by 
managers or stockholders 
20.00 1.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.80 0.00 0.38 
 
4.65 0.88 
 
1.41 0.62 
The letters in parenthesese in the left column refer to the questions in Graham and Harvey (2001). 
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Table 9: Survey responses to the question "What factors affect your firm’s choice between short-and long-term debt?" 
Panel A  U.K.  Netherlands  Germany  France  Europe (BM)  U.S. (GH) 
Summary statistics  % always  % always  % always  % always   % always  % always  
   or almost  or almost  or almost  or almost   or almost  or almost  
   always mean always mean always mean always mean  always mean always mean
                    
(b) Matching the maturity of our debt with the life of our assets  58.73 2.16 
 
57.45 2.55 
 
60.34 2.55 
 
31.91 1.68 
 
77.01 3.10 
 
63.25 2.60 
(g) We issue long-term debt to minimize the risk of having to 
refinance in “bad times” 
 28.81 1.39 
 
47.62 1.90**
 
51.75 2.24 
 
31.91 1.68 
 
69.77 2.83 
 
48.83 2.15 
(a) We issue short term when short term interest rates are low 
compared to long term rates 
 16.39 1.11 
 
25.00 1.48 
 
37.39 1.93 
 
30.19 1.58 
 
n.a. n.a. 
 
35.94 1.89 
(c) We issue short-term when we are waiting for long-term 
market interest rates to decline 
 11.48 0.89 
 
13.95 1.05 
 
37.39 1.90 
 
16.98 1.15 
 
31.03 1.85 
 
28.70 1.78 
(d) We borrow short-term so that returns from new projects 
can be captured more fully by shareholders. rather than 
committing to pay long-term profits as interest to 
debtholders 
 12.90 0.82 
 
9.09 0.80**
 
4.42 0.54 
 
13.21 0.83 
 
5.75 1.02 
 
9.48 0.94 
(e) We expect our credit rating to improve. so we borrow 
short-term until it does 
 5.00 0.57 
 
4.65 0.47 
 
7.89 0.58 
 
11.76 0.75 
 
7.14 0.90 
 
8.99 0.85 
(f) Borrowing short-term reduces the chance that our firm will 
want to take on risky projects 
 1.72 0.45 
 
2.33 0.40 
 
6.31 0.59 
 
15.22 0.83 
 
1.16 0.53 
 
4.02 0.53 
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Table 9: Survey responses to the question "What factors affect your firm’s choice between short-and long-term debt?" 
Panel B  U.K.  Netherlands  Germany  France 
Leverage and target ratio breakdowns  Leverage Target ratio Leverage Target ratio Leverage Target ratio Leverage Target ratio 
   Low High No Yes Low High No Yes Low High No Yes Low High No Yes 
                      
(b) Matching the maturity of our debt with the life of our assets
 
1.88 2.83** 1.50 2.54**  2.61 2.47 2.06 2.81*  2.28 2.98*** 1.89 2.86***  1.70 1.78 1.42 2.38** 
(g) We issue long-term debt to minimize the risk of having to 
refinance in “bad times”  
0.91 2.17*** 0.46 2.03***  1.87 1.95 1.57 2.07  1.93 2.71*** 2.03 2.33  1.59 2.13 1.31 2.47** 
(a) We issue short term when short term interest rates are low 
compared to long term rates  
0.94 1.44 0.50 1.50***  1.56 1.37 1.53 1.45  1.90 1.98 1.79 2.00  1.47 2.10 1.61 1.53 
(c) We issue short-term when we are waiting for long-term 
market interest rates to decline  
0.55 1.44*** 0.38 1.22***  1.17 0.89 0.71 1.21  1.80 2.04 1.54 2.06*  1.07 1.56 1.06 1.35 
(d) We borrow short-term so that returns from new projects 
can be captured more fully by shareholders. rather than 
committing to pay long-term profits as interest to 
debtholders 
 
0.73 0.89 0.67 0.86  0.88 0.68 0.71 0.83  0.56 0.51 0.73 0.45  0.70 1.40 0.64 1.24 
(e) We expect our credit rating to improve. so we borrow 
short-term until it does  
0.42 0.83 0.25 0.77**  0.42 0.53 0.50 0.45  0.45 0.78 0.57 0.58  0.55 1.67 0.66 0.94 
(f) Borrowing short-term reduces the chance that our firm will 
want to take on risky projects  
0.31 0.59 0.33 0.55  0.29 0.53 0.36 0.41  0.42 0.86** 0.42 0.68  0.75 1.33 0.72 1.07 
Averages marked with *, **, *** are significantly different at a 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence level from the average is the preceeding column, using a standard differences of means test. “n.a.” is not available. The letters 
in parenthesese in the left column refer to the questions in Graham and Harvey (2001). 
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